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Gary and Roach: The Proper Regulatory Treatment of Investment in Cancelled Utilit

THE PROPER REGULATORY TREATMENT
OF INVESTMENT IN CANCELLED UTILITY

PLANTS
Richard D. Gary and Edgar M. Roach, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970's, the demand for electricity in this country
was expected to increase approximately seven percent annually for
the foreseeable future.1 At that rate, the demand for electric power

would have doubled in less than ten years.2 As a result of this projected increase, many electric utilities embarked on large-scale construction programs to build new plants. The forecasted growth in demand, however, did not occur. In the mid-1970's, the demand
growth slowed to about two percent.3 Many utilities were left with
excess capacity from plants already completed or were forced to cancel further construction of plants in various phases of completion. 4
* Partners at Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia and Raleigh, North Carolina,
respectively. The authors wish to express their appreciation for the expert assistance provided
by William D. Johnson, Laurence E. Skinner and Thomas E. Graham in the preparation of
this article.
1.

ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., OFFICE OF COAL, NUCLEAR, ELEC. &

ALTERNATE

FUELS, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS: CAUSES, COSTS & CONSE-

7 (1983) [hereinafter cited as EIA REPORT].
2. Heidel, Guarding the Future of Electricity, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 6, 1984, at 22.
3. Id. at 23.
4. From 1975 through 1982, 30 fossil units and 73 nuclear units, with a combined capacity of 100,917 megawatts, were cancelled. C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES 17 (1984). Some commentators have characterized these plants that were later cancelled as "mistakes." Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Cancelled
Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 497-98 (1984). Professor Pierce discusses the legal and policy issues related to the investment in large capital intensive energy
projects that were either cancelled or resulted in excess capacity and concludes that the
projects were "mistakes in retrospect." Id. at 498. This Article does not attempt to judge the
wisdom of the utilities' investment in the projects. Rather, it provides a framework for utility
commissions to deal with the recovery of the costs incurred. We must take exception, however,
with Professor Pierce's charcterization of cancelled plants as mistakes. This characterization
employs a hindsight analysis and judges utility decisions solely in terms of result. See infra
notes 26-27, 33-34, 37-43, 160-206 and accompanying text (discussing differences between a
hindsight rationale, a standard of reasonableness under all of the circumstances at the time,
QUENCES
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Financial difficulties resulting from such large-scale construction
programs contributed to the need to cancel further construction of
5
generating plants.
When a utility decides to cancel a plant under construction, the
regulatory commission having jurisdiction over that utility's rates
customarily reviews the decision to determine the appropriate
ratemaking treatment for the investment in the project.6 This review
usually occurs in a rate proceeding when the utility requests recovery
of the investment in the unfinished plant.
A utility commission should use a two-step analysis to determine the treatment of the cost of a cancelled plant. First, the commission should apply the prudent investment test 7 to determine if the
utility may recover the costs it incurred. Second, if the commission
determines that some or all of the costs were prudently incurred and
are therefore recoverable, the commission should utilize a ratemaking method that permits the utility to recover fully its prudent investment. Section I of this Article analyzes the theory and application of the prudent investment test for determining whether any of
the costs of a cancelled plant may be recovered. 8 Section II discusses
the proper method for achieving full recovery of those costs.9
I.

DETERMINATION OF THE PRUDENTLY INCURRED COSTS OF
CANCELLED PLANTS

A fundamental precept of public utility regulation is that utilities should recover fully their prudently incurred expenses through
and the used and useful test, i.e., the end result).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 215-20 (discussing the five factors influencing utility decisions to cancel nuclear plants).
6.

See infra notes 15-61 and accompanying text. The Energy Information Administra-

tion defines the abandonment cost of a cancelled nuclear power plant as:
that cost which would have been avoided if the project had never been undertaken.
Abandonment cost consists of the following components:
- Cash expenditures

- Allowance for Funds Used During Construction (AFUDC)
- Contract cancellation penalties
- Salvage value (a "negative" cost)

- Site shutdown costs.
The first two components account for most of the cost and are accurately

known at the time of cancellation. The latter three components are generally not
accurately known for months, or even years, following cancellation.
EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at xiii (footnote omitted).
7. See infra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 15-225 and accompanying text.
9. See Infra notes 132-225 and accompanying text.
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the ratemaking process.10 The prudently incurred costs associated
with a cancelled plant should be treated no differently. 1 No uniform
standard, however, is applied by utility commissions to determine
whether the costs of cancelled plants should be recovered through
rates. State utility commissions often fail to identify or explain the
weight given to the factors they consider in deciding whether to allow recovery. Some decisions are announced with no accompanying

rationale.1 2 Few commissions discuss or apply the same factors used
by commissions of other jurisdictions; even factors considered in earlier decisions from the same jurisdiction may be ignored."

Some commissions, however, have articulated rationales for allowing or disallowing recovery of cancelled plant costs. A few of
these commissions apply the used and useful test 4 strictly and deny
recovery.1 5 Other commissions, using several rationales, have allowed
10. The prudent investment test was set forth by the Supreme Court in West Ohio Gas
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935). See also Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 288-89 (1923).
11. See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., In re Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 44 P.U.R.4th 54, 61 (N.J. Bd. Pub.
Util. 1981) (the Board based rate change findings on an "investigation and consideration of
the entire record").

13.

EDISON ELEC. INST. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, LEGAL APPROACHES TO ANALYZING

at v (1983).
14. The test requires that property be used and useful in serving the ratepayers before
recovery of the cost of that property is allowed. Many state statutes include this concept in
determining which property should be in rate base. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-506
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.06 (West Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133 (1982); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 196.05 (West Supp. 1984-85). Courts and commissions have not given "used
and useful" a purely technical meaning. Instead, they have defined the terms as they are utilized in common speech. The Washington Supreme Court, for example, cited Webster's Third
New International Dictionary in defining "used" as "employed in accomplishing something."
People's Org. for Wash. Energy Resources v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n., 101
Wash. 2d 425, 430, 679 P.2d 922, 925 (1984). The Kansas Supreme Court cited 73 C.J.S.
Public Utilities § 18, current version at 73B C.J.S. Public Utilities § 24 (1983), for the general definition of "useful." Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 218 Kan. 670,
676, 544 P.2d 1396, 1401 (1976) (defining "useful" as "reasonably necessary to the furnishing
of the product or service") (quoting 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities § 18, current version at 73B
C.J.S. Public Utilities § 24 (1983)).
15. Courts and commissions, in applying the used and useful test to deny recovery of
investment in cancelled plants, have reasoned that if a utility's construction project is cancelled
prior to completion, the plant never became used and useful in rendering utility service and
therefore should be ignored for ratemaking purposes. In re Pacific Power & Light Co., 53
P.U.R.4th 24, 27 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983).
Various state commissions or courts have applied the used and useful standard to deny
recovery of cancelled plant costs. See, e.g., Citizens Action Coalition, Inc. v. Northern Ind.
Pub. Serv. Co., 472 N.E.2d 938 (Ind. App. 1984); In re Pacific Power & Light Co., 53
P.U.R.4th 24 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 12 Ohio St. 3d 320, 466 N.E.2d 917 (1984) (per curiam); Office of Consumers'
WHETHER ELECTRIC UTILITIES HAVE EXCESs GENERATING CAPACITY
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the recovery of the prudent costs of a cancelled plant.16
A.

The Prudent Investment Test

The majority of state utility commissions addressing the issue of
recovery of costs for plant cancellation have employed the prudent
investment test, 7 which requires a factual evaluation of a utility's
actions concerning the planning and construction of the plant. This
test allows a regulatory commission to analyze the inherent uncertainties and difficulties in the construction of technically complex
generating facilities. The regulatory commission evaluates the appropriateness of discrete actions by utility management. If a management decision was prudent when made, the financial risks of that
decision are passed on to the ratepayers; if, however, the decision
was imprudent when made, the utility and its investors must bear
the costs. The test ensures that ratepayers do not pay for imprudent
actions by utility companies. The prudence of an action is determined by evaluating the decision-making process rather than the final result of that process.
A utility's recovery of operating expenditures, as well as costs
associated with plant abandonment, should be disallowed only when
the expenditures are shown to have been unreasonable. 18 As the
court stated in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.:19
In the absence of a showing of inefficiency, improvidence, waste or
bad faith on the part of management, the Commission cannot legally ignore the necessary, fair and reasonable expenses of operations incurred in the rendition of service by the utility but must
give heed to, consider and allow all such expenses constituting
charges upon income during the term of the regulation. 0
Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n, 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981); In re Pacific
Power & Light Co., 49 P.U.R.4th 82 (Or. P.U.C. 1982); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 677 P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1984).
16. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
17. See EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 41, 52. •
18. See, e.g., West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 68 ("A public
utility will not be permitted to include negligent or wasteful losses among its operating
charges."). The Energy Information Administration states: "Of all the costs incurred during
the [nuclear facility] project period, only a small amount is normally disallowed for being
unnecessary or uneconomic. Examples of these costs are advertising, public relations expenses,
and political lobbying expenses." EIA REPORT. supra note 1, at 39 (footnote omitted).
19. 253 Ala. 1, 42 So. 2d 655 (1949).
20, Id. at 23, 42 So. 2d at 674.
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Similarly, Professor Priest stated that expenditures may be
disallowed:
(1) if the questioned outlays represent "inefficiency" or "improvidence," or (2) managerial discretion has been abused, or (3) the
action taken has been "arbitrary," or "inimical to the public interest," or (4) there has been "economic waste," or (5) such outlays
were not legitimate operating expenses because they were "in ex'
cess of just and reasonable charges." 21
Like operating expenses, investments in a plant may not be excluded from rates unless unreasonably incurred. Justice Brandeis
recognized this in his dissenting opinion in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission:22
The term "prudent investment" is not used in a critical sense.
There should not be excluded from the finding of the base, investments which, under ordinary circumstances, would be deemed reasonable. The term is applied for the purpose of excluding what
might be found to be dishonest or obviously wasteful or imprudent
expenditures. Every investment may be assumed to have been made
in the exercise of reasonable judgment, unless the contrary is
shown.

23

The New York Public Service Commission adopted the prudent
investment test as early as 196424 and has consistently applied it in
evaluating utility actions.2 5 As articulated by the Commission in
Opinion No. 79-1:26
[T]he company's conduct should be judged by asking whether the
conduct was reasonable at the time, under all the circumstances,
considering that the company had to solve its problems prospectively rather than in reliance on hindsight. In effect, our responsiwould have performed
bility is to determine how reasonable people
7
the tasks that confronted the company.
21.
22.
23.
24.
(1964).

1 A.J.G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 51 (1969).
262 U.S. 276 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 289 n.1 (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
See In re Consolidated Edison Co., 4 N.Y.P.S.C. 129, 212, 54 P.U.R.3d 43, 112

25. See, e.g., In re Long Island Lighting Co., No. 84-25, slip op. at 9-10, 52 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n Sept. 19, 1984); In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., 41 P.U.R.4th 438, 442
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 16 P.U.R.4th 317, 328
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
26. In re Consolidated Edison Co., No. 79-1 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan. 16, 1979).

27. Id., slip op. at 5-6.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1985

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW RE VIEW

(Vol. 13:469

This language has been cited repeatedly by the New York Public

Service Commission and by commissions in other jurisdictions.28
Although the New York Attorney General has recently argued
for the adoption of the used and useful test, a New York appellate
court affirmed the Commission's rejection of that standard for analyzing the costs of abandoned or cancelled plants. 9 In Abrams v.
Public Service Commission,"0 Consolidated Edison requested recov-

ery of the costs incurred in developing a pumped storage hydroelectric generating plant that was cancelled in 1980.1 The New York
Public Service Commission found that Consolidated Edison acted
prudently, and authorized recovery of the expenditures. 2 On appeal,
the Attorney General argued for denial of recovery because the plant
was never used and useful in supplying service to the ratepayers. 3 In
rejecting this argument, the court stated:
The guiding concept applicable to the facts of this case was stated
by Justice Brandeis in his [dissenting] opinion in Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm..... [when he stated that]
"the thing devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific
property, tangible and intangible, but capital embarked in the enterprise." It follows that the test of whether expenditures may be
deemed used and useful is not whether the expenditures have resulted in a facility providing electric service to the public, but
whether the expenditures were prudently undertaken toward that
end.

34

28. See, e.g., In re Detroit Edison Co., 52 P.U.R.4th 318, 325 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1983); In re Long Island Lighting Co., No. 84-25, slip op. at 8 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Sept. 19, 1984); In re Consolidated Edison Co., 45 P.U.R.4th 325, 331 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1982); In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., 41 P.U.R.4th 438, 444 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1981). The New York Commission has changed its definition of "prudence"
from a "rational" basis for decisions to a "reasonable under all circumstances" basis. Compare
In re Consolidated Edison Co., 4 N.Y.P.S.C. 129, 212, 54 P.U.R.3d 43, 112 (1964) (considering whether there was rational basis for management's decisions), with In re Consolidated
Edison Co., 45 P.U.R.4th 325, 332 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982) and In re Consolidated
Edison Co., No. 79-I, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan. 16, 1979) (considering
reasonableness of decisions at the time made, under all circumstances, and without the benefit
of hindsight).
29. Abrams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 104 A.D.2d 135, 137-38, 483 N.Y.S.2d 785, 78788 (1984). The court concluded that to adopt the used and useful test would give the Commission more authority than it was granted by law. Id. at 137, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
30. 104 A.D.2d 135, 483 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1984).
31. Id. at 136, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 786-87.
32. Id. at 136, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
33. Id. at 137, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
34. Id. at 137-38, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 787-88 (citation omitted).
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Other jurisdictions have also rejected the used and useful test.3 5
The prudent investment test is the proper test for determining
the treatment of the costs of cancelled plants. In addition to being
theoretically sound, the test allows a regulatory commission the flexibility to thoroughly examine the facts and circumstances of management's decisions, and produces a fair result. In contrast, the used and
useful test strips the regulatory commission of all authority and discretion." The commission must blindly deny all recovery, notwithstanding the potentially devastating effect such a decision might
have on the utility.
B. Application of the Prudent Investment Test
A determination of whether a decision by utility management
was prudent requires an inquiry into whether the decision was prudent when made. In making that inquiry, a number of guidelines
must be observed. In reviewing the reasonableness of expenditures,
good faith on the part of the utility must be presumed. Management
must, of course, be responsible for its actions, but decisions must be
viewed from the perspective that management will act appropriately
in its duty to assure adequate service to the ratepayers. Justice Cardozo, delivering the opinion of the Court in West Ohio Gas Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission,3 7 stated that "[g]ood faith is to be presumed on the part of the managers of a business. .

.

. In the ab-

sence of a showing of inefficiency or improvidence, a court will not
substitute its judgment for theirs as to the measure of a prudent
outlay."38
In addition, care must be taken to view management decisions
on the basis of facts known at the time, not on the basis of hindsight
or knowledge of events subsequent to the decisions at issue. A judgment based on hindsight is neither appropriate, fair, nor legally
sound. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Wisconsin Telephone Co.
35.

See, e.g., In re United Illuminating Co., 55 P.U.R.4th 252, 268 (Conn. Dep't Pub.

Utils. 1983); In re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 50 P.U.R.4th 500, 531-36 (D.C. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1982); Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 62
P.U.R.4th 557, 582-83 (Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n 1984).

36. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 262
U.S. 276, 288-89 (1923). The court noted that a state is not "clothed with the general power

of management" of a public utility, and therefore, may not substitute its own judgment for
that of directors. The scope of its duties is merely to regulate with respect to enforcing reason-

able rates. Id.
37.

294 U.S. 63 (1935).

38. Id. at 72 .(citations omitted).
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v. Public Service Commission,3" stated that "the Commission may
not ignore actual expenses because in the light of experience and
present conditions, it is possible to say that some part of the expense
might have been avoided."' 40 The same view was expressed by the
Hawaii Public Utilities Commission over sixty years ago:
Courts and Commissions too often take the position of examining
the entire situation from the standpoint of the date of the examination and, in the light of present knowledge as to the past happenings, wisely, learnedly, and sometimes caustically criticizing and
penalizing for honest mistakes in judgment that under the circumstances would perhaps have been made with fully as great facility
by the court or the Commission had such court or Commission
been in the shoes of the management .... 11
In order to produce an accurate assessment of reasonableness or prudence, management decisions must be viewed in the context in which
decision-making occurred.4 2
Finally, the inquiry into prudence should assess whether the
utility's decision-making process was reasonable, not whether the decisions produced an unfortunate result or whether some other course
of action might have produced a better result. As the District of Columbia Public Service Commission stated: "[The parties opposing
the utility are] contending that where hindsight can demonstrate an
arguably superior alternative to the one selected by the utility, then
the utility has acted imprudently. This standard seems unduly
harsh. . . . This reasoning tends to hold the utility absolutely liable
43
for any plant cancellation.
C. Decisions Subject to a Determinationof Prudence
The determination of prudence involves a factual analysis that
commissions approach in various ways. Some commissions have ap44
parently looked only at the initial decision to build the plant. If
39. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 232 Wis. 274, 287 N.W. 122 (1939),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 657 (1940).
40. Id. at 368, 287 N.W. at 167.
41. In re Kohala Ditch Co., 1922A P.U.R. 1, 37-38 (Hawaii P.U.C. 1921). See In re
Consolidated Edison Co., 45 P.U.R.4th 325, 331-32 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982).
42. In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., No. 84-23, slip op. at 14-16 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Aug. 29, 1984).
43. In re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 50 P.U.R.4th 500, 535 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1982).
44, See, e.g., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 16 P.U.R.4th 317, 328 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1976); In re Duke Power Co., 49 P.U.R.4th 483 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1982).
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that decision was prudent, all costs related to the plant may be recovered. Other commissions may examine both the decision to build
and the decision to cancel.4 5 If both decisions were prudent, the utility may recover the cost of the cancelled plant. Still other commissions engage in a more detailed analysis and examine the major decisions in the plant construction process: the decision to build,
decisions during construction, and the decision to canceL"4 Under
this latter approach, all management decisions in the process must
be prudent before costs associated with those decisions may be recovered. As the New York Public Service Commission stated: "[W]e
will consider the prudence of petitioners' actions in view of the circumstances prevailing at the time each significant decision to pursue
the project further was made . .

.-

7

The most significant points in the decision-making process include the decision to build, the decisions during construction, and the
decision to cancel. The factors used to determine whether these decisions were prudent are discussed below.
1. The Decision to Build. - The initial decision to add generating capacity is usually based on the need to meet increasing demand. 48 Often the determination of prudence will depend on the procedures used for projecting load growth or the accuracy of demand
forecasts. 49 In jurisdictions that have such procedures, the review by
a siting board5" for a certificate to construct the plant will often indicate that the decision to build was prudent.
45. See, e.g., In re San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 31 P.U.R.4th 435 (Cal. P.U.C. 1979).
The court found that the plant was not imprudent in its "inception, continuation, and termina-

tion." Id. at 499.
46.

See In re Central I11. Light Co., 57 P.U.R.4th 351, 358-62 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n

1983); In re Boston Edison Co., 46 P.U.R.4th 431, 461-71 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982); In
re Detroit Edison Co., 52 P.U.R.4th 318, 321-27 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983); In re
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 41 P.U.R.4th 438, 444-49 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981).

47.

In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 41 P.U.R.4th 438, 444 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.

Comm'n 1981) (emphasis added).

48.

See In re Detroit Edison Co., 52 P.U.R.4th 318, 320 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n

1983). Cf. EIA

REPORT.

supra note 1, at 39 ("Generally, there is little debate over the pru-

dence of the decision to build the plants because when most of these plants were planned,
nuclear power appeared to offer the cheapest source of baseload electricity.").

49.

See In re Central I11.
Light Co., 57 P.U.R.4th 351, 356-58, 361-62 (Iil. Commerce

Comm'n 1983).
50. The nature and extent of the siting board's duties and scope of power depends upon
the authority granted to it by the particular state's enabling statute. Power facility site selection must reconcile consumer needs with environmental concerns and, depending upon the

state, requires numerous permits from many state agencies or consideration by only one state
agency. For a full listing of various state processes, see 1 H. GREEN, ENERGY LAW SERVICE §
5.22 (1978-1980).
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In New York, a certificate issued by the siting board creates a
strong presumption that management's decision to build was prudent. 1 In In re Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.,52 the New York
Public Service Commission conducted an extensive examination of
Rochester Gas & Electric's (RG&E) actions in planning to construct and subsequently cancelling construction of a nuclear generating unit at the Sterling site." In January, 1978, the siting board
issued a certificate of public need granting RG&E authority to construct the plant. 4 In May, 1978, the siting board suspended that
authorization in order to reconsider the need for additional capacity. 55 After lengthy hearings, the siting board cancelled the certificate in 1980, denying the company authority to construct the plant.5 6
In a subsequent proceeding to determine the treatment of the
resulting loss, the New York Public Service Commission found that
all costs incurred before the siting board's suspension of the certificate were prudent.5 The Commission based this finding on the siting
board's determination of need. RG&E did not have to present evidence of the prudence of its actions prior to the initial issuance of
the certificate in January, 1978, because the decision of the siting
board was proof of the need for the facility.58 Those expenditures
could be challenged, but the burden was on the challengers to prove
imprudence.59 After the certificate was issued, until it was suspended
in May, 1978, the presumption of prudence was not as strong because RG&E was aware that conditions bearing on the question of
need were changing. Nevertheless, the Commission found those actions prudent.6 0 After the siting board suspended the certificate,
however, the burden shifted to RG&E to prove that any subsequent
51.

In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 41 P.U.R.4th 438, 446 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.

Comm'n 1981).
52. Id. at 438.
53. Id. at 446-52.
54. Id. at 441.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 442 & n.5. Based on growth projections, the siting board concluded that only
half the capacity represented by plant advocates would be needed, and not until much later
than had been predicted. Id.
57. Id. at 444-46.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 446.

60. Id. The Commission concluded that general expenditures during this time period
were prudent. They deferred decision on the prudence of certain individual expenditures, how-

ever, until Phase II of the proceeding was completed. Id. at 449. Phase I was devoted to
examining general expenses, and Phase II to analyzing individual items in detail. Id. at 440.
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expenditures were prudent." The effect of the siting board's issuance
of the certificate was to provide strong evidence of the prudence of
expenditures for the plant.2
The Connecticut Department of Public Utilities (CDPU), in In
re United Illuminating Co.,63 deferred totally to the approval of the
Public Utilities Control Authority (the Authority), which periodically reviewed the utility's continued participation in a nuclear project.8 4 The CDPU's opinion, in part, dealt with the utility's involvement in the cancelled Pilgrim II nuclear plant."" Since all of the
utility's expenditures were made during the period when the Authority was overseeing the utility's actions, the expenditures were deemed
prudent and the utility was allowed recovery. 6 The effect of monitoring by the Authority was similar to review by a siting board.
The utility commissions in the two preceding cases correctly apportioned responsibility for decisions concerning cancelled plants
that were made jointly by public service commissions and utility
companies. If a commission has authorized the company to proceed
with a project by issuing a siting permit, or has otherwise overseen
the company's actions in undertaking a project, that commission
should be estopped from denying the prudence of the company's decision to construct. Commissions should not be able to disavow their
prior approval of the project, based on subsequent events.
Failure to obtain siting board approval before incurring certain
costs can result in a finding of imprudence and denial of recovery. In
In re Idaho Power Co.,6 7 the utility, Idaho Power, purchased a boiler
for a proposed plant before obtaining a certificate of convenience and
necessity to construct the plant.6 8 When the project was later cancelled, the public service commission refused to allow the utility to
recover the cost of the boiler because the cost was not reasonably
incurred. 9 Idaho Power did not introduce any evidence to show the
61. Id. at 449.
62. Id. at 446.
63. 55 P.U.R.4th 252 (Conn. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1983).
64. Id. at 259-60, 268. The Authority consisted of three of the CDPU's five commissioners. Id. at 254.
65. Id. at 268.
66. Id.
67. Case No. U-1006-185, Order No. 17499 (Idaho P.U.C. Aug. 20, 1982).
68. Id., slip op. at 36. Accord Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 677
P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1984). The court found that the utility must bear the burden of the plant
failure since it had not sought approval by the Public Service Commission prior to its investment. Id. at 808-09.
69. Case No. U-1006-185, Order No. 17499, slip op. at 36-38.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1985

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:469

necessity of ordering the boiler when it did to ensure delivery or save
costs. 70 The commission stated that there was "not one shred of evidence to show that Idaho Power Company could not have waited
until the Commission's decision [regarding the certificate of convenience and necessity] . . .to secure a boiler for that plant." 7'
Although the rationale in Idaho Power - that utilities should
not commit to major expenditures before necessary - is appealing,
the fact that expenditures are made before siting board approval is
not conclusive proof that the expenditures were imprudent. Many expenditures are required to enable a utility to present a full explanation of the proposed project to regulatory and licensing agencies.
Preliminary engineering and design plans, environmental testing, and
options on or purchase of potential sites - all sizeable expenditures
are often required to complete a presentation to these authorities.
In addition, companies attempting to build duplicate or replicate
plants often have to commit to procurement obligations prior to the
issuance of a siting board permit in order to ensure that the duplicate or replicate components will be available. The need to make
pre-permit expenditures is also exacerbated by the often lengthy permit hearing process. If reasonable managers would have made these
expenditures, recovery of the costs should be allowed regardless of
the ultimate decision concerning the plant.
2. Decisions Made During Construction. - Utilities periodically review the progress and continued need for new capacity during
the construction process. A utility will frequently begin a new project and then decide to delay further construction because of revised
load forecasts72 or problems in financing.73 In such cases, a commission must determine whether decisions to delay and to resume construction activity were prudent.
In In re Detroit Edison Co.,74 the Michigan Commission reviewed utility decisions to delay and then resume construction.75 The
70. Id., slip op. at 37-38.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., In re Central Ill. Light Co., 57 P.U.R.4th 351 (I11.
Commerce Comm'n
1983). In this case, the utility repeatedly deferred the projected operation date of its new plant
because of significant decreases in usage and peak demand requirements after the 1973 oil

shortage.
73,
Comm'n
74.
75.

Id. at 353-54. For a review of the management decisions involved, see id. at 358-61.
See In re Detroit Edison Co., 52 P.U.R.4th 318, 319-20, 324 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
1983).
52 P.U.R.4th 318 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983).
Id. at 324-26.
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utility began the Greenwood nuclear project in 1971 .7 In 1974, the
utility was forced to delay construction due to financing problems.7
Forecasts indicated, however, that the unit would be needed at a
later date.78 In 1978, the utility resumed engineering and licensing
activities but the project was further delayed by the moratorium on
licensing following the incident at Three Mile Island.79 The project
was finally terminated because of uncertainty in economic conditions
and financial markets.80 The Michigan Commission found that,
given the long lead times for constructing new facilities and continued forecasts of a demand for additional capacity, the decisions to
delay and subsequently resume construction were prudent. 81 The
Commission refused to substitute its judgment for that of the board
of directors.8 2
In In re Central Illinois Light Co.,83 the Illinois Commerce
Commission reviewed Central Illinois Light Company's (CILCO)
decisions concerning the planned construction of the Duck Creek II
generating unit.84 CILCO's 1972 load forecast indicated a need for
an additional unit.8 5 The utility began engineering work in 1973,86
and placed an order for a generator with a 1977 delivery date. 7
CILCO elected to defer manufacture of the generator in 1975 because forecasts indicated that the plant would not be needed until
1982.88

In 1978, CILCO asked the generator manufacturer to begin
fabrication in order to meet the projected plant in-service date of
1982.89 Later, CILCO twice more deferred the in-service date. 0 The
project was deferred indefinitely in May, 1982.91 While CILCO re76. Id. at 319-20.
77. Id. at 320.
78. Id.
79. Id. According to the EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 26, "[a]fter the Three Mile
Island nuclear accident, there was a 10-month moratorium on the issuance of operating licenses . ... "
80. 52 P.U.R.4th at 320.
81. Id. at 325-26.
82. Id. at 325.
83. 57 P.U.R.4th 351 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1983).
84. Id.at 352, 358-62.
85. Id. at 353.
86. Id.
87. Id.at 354.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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peatedly deferred the in-service date, the generator was completed
and placed in storage.92
CILCO's decision to approve manufacture of the generator in
1978 was challenged by the Commission staff and intervenors in the
case. The Commission found that CILCO acted prudently in continuing manufacture of the generator, noting that it was cheaper to
complete the generator and store it until needed than to suspend its
manufacture.9 3 The Commission also found that, since CILCO did
not determine until 1982 that it would not need the plant at all,
authorizing continued manufacture of the generator prior to that
time was prudent.9 '
3. The Decision to Cancel. - The factors used to determine
whether the decision to cancel the plant was prudent are similar to
those used to evaluate the initial decision to build a plant, i.e.,
whether the plant is needed and economical to complete. For example, in In re Virginia Electric and Power Co., 5 the Virginia Commission found that projected load growth had declined considerably
and that the cost of completing North Anna Unit 4, a proposed nuclear facility, had nearly tripled. 96 Therefore, the Commission found
the decision to cancel North Anna Unit 4 proper. 97 And in Atlantic
City Electric Co., 8 the utility decided to cancel construction of the
Hope Creek II nuclear facility because its construction so weakened
cash flow that completion of Hope Creek I was jeopardized. 99 The
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities found this decision prudent and
allowed recovery of the costs associated with the abandonment.1 00
The timing of the decision to cancel is significant in determining
prudence. Utilities have been penalized for delaying the decision and
incurring unnecessary costs.10 ' In In re Long Island Lighting Co., °2
92. Id.
93. Id. at 358, 361.
94. Id. at 361-62.
95. 44 P.U.R.4th 46 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n 1981).
96. Id. at 49. The EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, states: "Significant downward
revision in the forecasted growth in peak load was the reason most frequently cited, being
involved in about half the units cancelled. . . . By the end of 1982, almost half of the utilities
cancelling nuclear units cited this as a reason for their cancellations." See also id. at 11-15
(Table 4).
97. 44 P.U.R.4th at 49.
98. 51 P.U.R.4th 109 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1983).
99. Id. at 115.
100. Id.
101. The Energy Information Administration stated:
Finally, by the time a plant is cancelled, it is usually clear that the cancellation
decision was sound, but there is often debate over whether the plant should have
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the utilities involved requested recovery of the cost of the cancelled
New Haven nuclear generating plant. 10 3 When the New York State
Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment (the Siting Board) rejected the application to construct the plant in 1979,
the utilities cancelled the project.10 4 The New York Public Service
Commission found that expenditures on the plant should have been
halted in 1977 because changes in load forecasts showed that the
plant was not needed.' 05 The Commission stated that, by late 1977,
the utilities should have been aware that the New Haven plant was
unnecessary and that further construction was unreasonable.1 06
The record in this proceeding also indicates, however, that the companies were insufficiently diligent with respect to their responsibility to promptly cease incurring expenditures on this project once it
became reasonably clear that the project no longer made planning
or economic sense. Rather than terminating this project and minimizing the cost to consumers as we believe they should have, the
companies' actions culminated in the filing of an [application for
Siting Board approval] even though one of the partners no longer
knew whether it would have a continuing interest in the project.
This action by LILCO caused us to say, in our order recommending dismissal of the [Siting Board application], that the companies' posture with regard to
New Haven seemed, at the time, to
°
107
be "close to irresponsible.
Because the plant was not cancelled until 1979, the Commission limited recovery to seventy percent of the costs incurred. 0 8
In In re Central Illinois Light Co.,' 09 the Illinois Commission
noted that the Central Illinois Light Co. (CILCO) quickly terminated further construction activity when it appeared that the Duck
Creek II project should be deferred indefinitely, and promptly notibeen cancelled sooner. If ... determine[d] that a unit should have been cancelled

sooner, given the information available to the utility's management, the costs incurred after the prudent cancellation date are disallowed. Such costs are borne by
the utility investors (predominantly the common shareholders) and by income
taxpayers.
EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 39.
102. No. 84-25 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Sept. 19, 1984).
103. Id., slip op. at 1-2.

104.

Id., slip op. at 5-7.

105.
106.
107.

Id., slip op. at 41.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

108.
109.

Id., slip op. at 52.
57 P.U.R.4th 351 (II1.Commerce Comm'n 1983).
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fled the Commission when the project was cancelled. 110 Since the
record indicated that CILCO acted reasonably and prudently, the
Commission found all costs incurred on the project prudent,,'
A continuum of events leads to the cancellation of a plant, with
each event triggering a review of management's decisions. From the
time of the initial decision to construct, during the actual construction, and through cancellation, the utility must act reasonably in
light of the facts known at the time. If a utility acts reasonably, costs
incurred in the construction are considered prudent and are recoverable. If a utility does not act reasonably, then the avoidable costs
incurred after a utility's imprudent action should not be recoverable.
D.

Quantifying the Acts of Imprudence

When a commission determines that a utility's decision was imprudent, the usual remedy is denial of recovery of the costs related to
that decision. The quantification of the costs resulting from acts of
imprudence must be performed by computing what costs the customers would have incurred but for the imprudent act." In some cases,
the determination of what costs customers would have incurred is a
fairly simple matter. In In re Idaho Power Co.," 3 the Idaho Commission refused to allow Idaho Power to recover the costs of a
boiler.'1 4 The cost of the decision which was held to be imprudent the cost of the boiler - was easily calculated.
Imprudence is sometimes found in the decision to continue construction when the plant is no longer needed. In In re Houston
Lighting and Power Co., 65 the utility began planning the Allen's
Creek Nuclear generating station in 1972.111 The project was suspended in 1975 because national economic conditions deflated the
utility's expectation of future load increases." 7 It was restarted in
1976, but subsequently cancelled in 1982. The Commission found
that the project should have been cancelled in late 1979 or early
10. Id. at 361.
Il1.
Id. at 362.
112. See In re Crystal River No. 3, No. 780732-EU (Fla. Pub. Sere. Comm'n Jan. 30,
1981); In re Boston Edison Co., D.P.U. No. 1009-G, slip op. at 6-7, 55-56 (Mass. Dep't Pub.
Utils. July 27, 1982); In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 80-25 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n June 24, 1980).
113. Case No. U-1006-185, Order No. 17499 (Idaho P.U.C. Aug. 20, 1982). See supra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
114. Case No. U-1006-185, Order No. 17499, slip op. at 37-38.
115. 50 P.U.R.4th 157 (Tex. P.U.C. 1982).
116. Id. at 188.
117. Id.
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1980, based upon increased licensing difficulties and cost increases."1 " The Commission disallowed recovery of all costs incurred
after January 1, 1980 - approximately $160 million of the total
$361.1 million.11 9
The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (MDPU)
similarly ruled that a project should have been cancelled sooner. In
In re Boston Edison Co.,120 the MDPU analyzed Boston Edison's
decisions regarding the Pilgrim II plant. 121 Boston Edison began the
project in 1971,122 and cancelled it in 1981.123 The Commission
found that the project should have been cancelled in June, 1980.124
The Commission stated that, given financing problems and the uncertainty of obtaining a construction permit, cancellation in 1980
was the only prudent course of action.125 Therefore, recovery of ex12 6
penses incurred after July 1, 1980, was denied.
A time line approach is useful for determining the remedy for
imprudent actions. All avoidable direct expenditures after an imprudent decision to continue construction should not be recoverable,
with the exception of cancellation costs required to shut down the
construction project.1 27 These shut down costs, such as contract termination payments, site restoration costs, and the like, would be incurred regardless of when the project was terminated and should be
allowed even when expended after cancellation.
This time line approach was not followed by the New York
Public Service Commission. In In re Long Island Lighting Co., 128

the New York Commission denied recovery of thirty percent of the
costs related to the New Haven plant because the utilities failed to
respond to changes in forecasted demand and delayed cancellation of
the project.1 29 No rationale, however, was given for the choice of this
118. Id. at 200. The EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 26, states that after the Three Mile
Island accident, "a new NRC ruling ... required the completion and approval of state and
local emergency evacuation plans prior to licensing. Additional standards emerged as a result
of follow-up studies, which caused more delays in construction programs."
119. 50 P.U.R.4th at 200.
120. 46 P.U.R.4th 431 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982).
121. Id. at 433.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 433-34.
124. Id. at 470-71.
125. Id. at 470.
126. Id. at 470-71.
127. Carrying charges (allowance for funds used during construction) on the prudently
incurred expenditures, however, should continue to accrue until their recovery through rates.
128. No. 84-25 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Sept. 19, 1984).
129. Id., slip op. at 41, 51-52.
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amount.13 0 The Commission apparently estimated the amount to be
recovered without any analysis of the actual harm from the imprudent decision.1 ' The date of the imprudent decision should have
been determined and all costs incurred after that date, with the exception of cancellation costs, made non-recoverable.
II.

RATEMAKING TREATMENT OF PRUDENTLY INCURRED COSTS

Once the amount of the prudent investment in the cancelled
plant is determined, a regulatory authority should allow the utility
full recovery of that amount. Full recovery of a prudent expenditure
can occur in either of two ways. The expenditure can be recovered
through rates in a single year, or it can be amortized into the cost of
service over a period of years with a return on the unrecovered balance. Because of the large dollar amounts involved, the prudently
incurred costs of a cancelled plant should normally be recovered
under the latter method. Whatever method is employed, the utility
should be entitled to full recovery of all costs incurred for prudent
investments in cancelled plants.
A.

The Need for Full Cost Recovery

One of the primary goals of utility regulation is to ensure that
the utility is able to provide the level of service demanded by its
customers. 2 A denial of full cost recovery of a utility's prudent in130. Id., slip op. at 51-52.
131. Id., slip op. at 52, 59. The record did not demonstrate that the utility so deviated
from the applicable standard of care to warrant total disallowance but also failed to show

entitlement to recover all the costs. Id., slip op. at 59.
132. For example, in In re Boston Edison Co., 46 P.U.R.4th 431, 471-73 (Mass. Dep't
Pub. Utils. 1982), Boston Edison was allowed to amortize its prudent expenditures on the
cancelled Pilgrim II unit into its costs of service and earn a 14% return on the unamortized
balance. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities gave great- weight-to Boston
Edison's need to meet the future demands of its customers:
The primary mandate that rates balance the interests of consumers and investors
must be applied here based upon our judgment of the appropriate factors that affect
such a balancing. It seems indisputable to us that no mathematical formula, including one that evenly divides dollar losses, can properly and logically effect a meaningful balance of interests. After considerable review, we have concluded that the factors which properly bear on the allocation of the loss at issue here are the following:
a. the prudence of the company's actions throughout the history of the
project;
b. the equity and fairness of any proposed allocation; and
c. the necessity of adjusting the financial impacts of any allocation to ensure the adequacy offuture service.

Id. at 461 (emphasis added). The DPU continued:
Because of the unusual magnitude of the Pilgrim II abandonment costs, our concern
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vestment in a cancelled plant severely undercuts that goal by creating both economic disincentives for the utility to commence construction of a large project, and reluctance to cancel a project
already begun. The Indiana Public Service Commission summarized
the problem as follows:
Indiana utilities are under statutory mandate to serve. . . .If, in
order to comply with the law, a utility must begin construction of
generating projects many years in advance of the need for the
power, it is the Commission's responsibility to assure that 3the risk
in doing so is not so great as to discourage the endeavor. 3
Since construction of base-load electric generating capacity requires the investment of mammoth amounts of capital over possibly
a decade or longer before a kilowatt-hour is generated,13 4 sufficient
incentive exists for prudent action by the utility without imposing
the further risk of cost disallowance. New York Administrative Law
Judge Frank S. Robinson set forth the risks inherent in undertaking
a construction project:
You do want to make sure the utility is not going to try to build a
white elephant; but looking at the industry in 1982, I don't think
this is the real problem. Any utility that contemplates major construction certainly faces an uphill struggle, contending with political opposition, financing difficulty, and the very real prospect that
even if all goes well, the utility will never really earn a compensawith the classic rate-setting dilemma of balancing the burdens is necessarily in-

creased. We refer specifically to the consumer's burden, which arises from the rate
increase necessary to compensate the company for money prudently invested on its
customers' behalf, as well as the company's burden, which results from the necessity

of a speedy financial recovery in order to ensure that the level of service demanded
by its consumers is provided. Under current economic conditions, both groups are

faced with continually rising prices and the resulting erosion of earnings. To ignore
this fact would be irresponsible. Our goal is to select an amortization methodology

which is equitable to both parties.
Id. at 472 (emphasis added). See generally C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 3, at 152-53 (the
goals of public utility regulation). But see In re Western Mass. Elec. Co., D.P.U. No. 84-25,

slip op. at 38-41 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1984) (rejecting prudent investment test and adopting competitive market model).

133. In re Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., No. 36689, slip op. at 12 (Ind. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Aug. 11, 1982). Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that "[w]here expenditures are prudent, investors should be able to anticipate that all such costs will eventually
be recovered from ratepayers. If investors are never certain whether the PSC will effectively
charge a prudent precertification expenditure to shareholders or ratepayers, such uncertainty

provides a disincentive for investors." Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109
Wis. 2d 256, 325 N.W.2d 867, 869-70 (1982).
134. See EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 21, 29.
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tory return for the undertaking. I think that we already
have ample
135
disincentives concerning unnecessary construction.

In fact, the bias against construction is already evident in the capital
markets where the stocks of utilities with ongoing nuclear construc-

tion programs are selling at substantial discounts below book value
and their debt ratings are lower than utilities without construction.

for those utilities with
This situation increases the cost of capital
6
underway.1
projects
large construction
Furthermore, the differentiation in the capital markets between
utilities with and without major construction programs illustrates another adverse result of regulatory policies that penalize prudent util135. Robinson, Regulatory Treatment of Cancelled Construction Project Costs, in REGULATORY REFORM: THE STATE OF THE REGULATORY ART; EMERGING CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES 110, 115 (Institute for Study of Regulation ed. 1984).
136. Dr. Charles M. Studness summarized investors' responses to the risks of construction as follows:
In retrospect, it is apparent that investors were oblivious to how alarmed ratepayers
had become by the escalating budgets of nuclear plants under construction, and the
crisis mentality [in investor confidence] developed when nuclear plant cost escalations and cancellations in late 1983 abruptly demonstrated that the utilities building
nuclear plants had far greater rate problems than investors previously believed.
Correspondingly, the crisis mentality disappeared as investors adjusted their expectations ....
By midyear [1984] the crisis atmosphere had pretty well vanished, but a legacy
remained. First, utility stock prices relative to each other had been restructured, and
this was reflected in an unusually large internal dispersion of utility stock yields and
stock price-to-book value ratios.
Second, the events that precipitated the crisis led to severe financial deterioration for utilities heavily involved in troubled nuclear plants ....
Finally, stiff resistance of ratepayers to nuclear plant costs had made recovery
of those costs in rates a critical regulatory issue.
Studness, The Marketfor Electric Utility Stocks in 1984, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 24, 1985, at
39. See also Eased Inflation, Lower Interest Rates Seen as Cause of Boost in Utility Stocks,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, Oct. 15, 1984, at 1, 2 (noting the improved stock prices of utilities
without big construction programs). Credit ratings also distinguish between utilities with and
without construction in progress. For example, Moody's Investors Service has forecast improved credit ratings for utilities that are free of the financing burdens of major construction
programs. Moody's Sees Credit Ratings Rising for Utilities Not Involved in Construction,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, Oct. 8, 1984, at 6. Accord EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (footnote
omitted), contending that:
[N]uclear plant cancellations have raised the cost of new debt and the associated
cost of electricity production for all utilities participating in the ownership of nuclear plants under construction. While the publicly owned utilities can float new
bond issues without seriously jeopardizing their financial stability, a saturated marketplace will demand higher interest rates on new bond issues for either type of
utility, particularly for enterprises with higher perceived risks due to their involvement in nuclear projects.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss3/2

20

19851

Gary and Roach: The Proper Regulatory Treatment of Investment in Cancelled Utilit
PROPER REGULATORY TREATMENT

ity decisions: Customers of a utility with an ongoing construction
program are forced to pay higher electric rates because of higher
costs of capital, even though that utility may be well-managed and
even though that construction program may result in needed costeffective power. As explained by the Vermont Public Service Board,
"[i]nvestors' perception of risk is to a large degree influenced by reg1' 37
ulatory trends nationwide.
In other words, regulators should not view themselves in isolation. They should consider the broader implications of any decision
to disallow prudently incurred costs. A decision allowing a utility to
fully recover its prudent cancellation costs directs the impact of the
cancellations to that utility and its customers. On the other hand,
requiring investors to bear all or part of a utility's prudent cancellation costs affects all utilities by creating an additional risk
premium.131
The bias against construction, created by severe regulatory
treatment of cancelled construction projects, carries with it a nationwide threat of energy deficiencies. In order to adequately serve the
projected demands of consumers, utilities must continue constructing
new generating capacity. Peak summer electrical demand in the
United States is projected to grow by 111,844 megawatts from 1983
to 1993.139 To meet this expected demand growth and to replace the
15,051 megawatts of planned capacity retirements, 140 utilities will
137.

In re Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 49 P.U.R.4th 372, 392 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd.

1982).
138. See In re Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound Power & Light
Co., 62 P.U.R.4th 557, 583 (Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n 1984) (adopting this rationale
to allow amortization of prudent cancellation costs, but without a return). Cf. ETA REPORT,
supra note 1, at 19. For a discussion of the ETA REPORT, see note 136.
139. NORTH AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, 1984 ANNUAL DATA SUMMARY REPORT:
ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY & DEMAND 1984-1993, 11 (1984). Actual 1983 summer demand
was 447,526 megawatts. Id. As of January 1, 1984, the peak demand projected for 1993 was
559,370 megawatts. Id. This represents an average annual growth rate of only 2.5%. Id. At
least two experts, John Sillin and John Siegal, dispute this projected growth rate as too low,
claiming that a five percent annual growth through the 1980's could be reached. Utility Industry Is UnderbuildingWarn A Pair of Experts and DOE's Hodel, ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, Mar.
26, 1984, at 5-6. This would require double the amount of new generating capacity that is
expected by the early 1990's. Id. Sillin and Siegal projected new capacity requirements of
between 450,000 and 700,000 megawatts this decade as compared to the industry's expected
additional capacity of 105,000 megawatts during the same period. Id. In a recent update to
their report, Sillin and Siegal revised the load growth forecast to increase between seven and
nine percent, up from their original forecast of between five and eight percent. Accounting
Consultant, Nuclear Power Booster Raise the High Growth Estimates, ELECTRIC UTIL
WEEK, Aug. 20, 1984, at 11.
140. NORTH AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, supra note 139, at 152.
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need to construct 130,767 megawatts of new capacity. 14 1 But, as of

January 1, 1984, only 58,900 megawatts of the required new capacity were more than fifty percent complete.1 42 Significantly, of that
58,900 megawatts, 44,500 megawatts consist of nuclear units,'143
some of which may never be placed in service because of the financial stress created by financing the construction and passing the regulatory obstacles. 144 For regulators to take any action creating disincentives to the planning for and construction of new capacity would
be extremely short-sighted. 4 5 Rather than creating disincentives,
regulators should be acting to ensure that the planning and construc-

tion required to meet future needs is properly encouraged. 46
14 I. Id. at 124. Because of capacity sales and capacity out of service in shutdown status,
a net increase in capacity resources from 1983 to 1993 of only 107,756 megawatts is expected.
Id. at 14-15.
Although a need to construct capacity has been recognized, a utility bias against construction already exists. For example, in October, 1984, former Consolidated Edison chairman
Charles Luce told utility executives at the Edison Electric Institute's 19th Annual Financial
Conference "to do everything possible to avoid [constructing] large new baseload plants." UtilIties Retain the Moral - If Not Legal - Obligation to Serve, Says Luce, ELECTRIC UTIL
WEEK, Oct. 29, 1984, at 7. See also Hodel Offers Some Ideas for Curing 'Paralysis'of New
Plant Construction, ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, Dec. 3, 1984, at 3 (Energy Secretary Hodel discusses proposed alternatives to current policies in order to counter "present obstacles to economically efficient investment in new generating capacity"); Delmarva P & L Does Not Want
to Build a New Plant Until 'The Public is Clamoring,' ELECTRIC UTIL WEEK, June 11, 1984,
at 5 (Delmarva Power & Light Co. president expresses the view that the utility places little
reliance on load forecasting generally and would not add a new baseload plant until public
demand so warranted).
142. NORTH AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, 14th ANNUAL REVIEW OF OVERALL RELIABILITY &

ADEQUACY

OF BULK POWER SUPPLY IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEMS OF

NORTH AMERICA 1984, at 10 (1984).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 14. See also In re Detroit Edison Co., 52 P.U.R. 4th 318, 320 (Mich. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1983) (partially constructed nuclear facility cancelled because of financing and
licensing difficulties). The situation in New York is similar to that expected nationally. Currently the state has 30,000 megawatts of installed capacity and has a historic peak of 21,867
megawatts. N.Y. Engineers Favor Nuclear, Energy Daily, Feb. 5, 1985, at 3, col. 2. In 15
years, 8,000 megawatts of the installed capacity will have been retired or will be ready for
retirement. Id. Therefore, even without considering growth in the demand for electricity, the
capacity reserve will fall to a mere 133 megawatts.
145. Fortunately for New Yorkers, the New York Public Service Commission has consistently allowed full recovery of the prudently incurred costs associated with cancelled generating units. See, e.g., In re Long Island Lighting Co., No. 84-25, slip op. at 52 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n Sept. 19, 1984) (noting that denial of a return did not constitute a change in
policy but was intended to achieve a desired level of write-offs); In re Rochester Gas & Elec.
Corp., 45 P.U.R.4th 386, 393-95 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982) (permitting recovery of
prudent expenditures even after suspension of siting board certification).
146. The inability to fully recover prudently invested funds might increase the risk that
unneeded capacity will be built. A utility faced with the possibility of either no recovery or
only a partial recovery of the costs of a cancelled unit might, if the decision to cancel is a close
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B.

Proper Ratemaking Treatment

Costs prudently incurred in furtherance of a public purpose are
appropriately considered expenses for ratemaking purposes.147 Full
recovery requires that the utility recover all of its prudently invested
capital,148 as well as a proper return on the unrecovered balance of
those costs. Notwithstanding a finding that the costs were prudently

incurred, such a return on the unrecovered balance has most often
been disallowed. 149 A smaller number of states have allowed a return
one, have an incentive to complete construction. The incentive to complete construction is even
greater when the used and useful doctrine is rigidly applied since the plant, once completed,
will be able to produce power and hence will stand a chance of being found to be used and
useful.
147. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 29 P.U.R.4th 65, 95-96 (Va. State Corp.
Comm'n 1979) (Shannon, Comm'r, dissenting in part).
148. According to the EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 37:
Most of [the capital invested during the planning and construction of a nuclear
plant] is borrowed in the form of debt and preferred stock which require annual
interest and dividend payments. The remainder is provided by common equity
shareholders who also require a return on their investment, though not entirely in
the form of current annual cash dividends. The costs of using funds from all of these
sources are accumulated and treated as part of the plant's total cost along with its
cash expenditures. These capital carrying charges are typically referred to as interest during construction (IDC) or as allowance for funds (used) during construction
(AFDC OR AFUDC) ....
Because AFUDC is a calculated charge derived from
direct expenditures, it is also known fairly accurately by the utility owner[s] at the
time of cancellation.
Id. Full cost recovery also entails a recovery of the capitalized allowance for funds used during
construction (AFUDC), since AFUDC is just as much a prudent cost of construction as the
other direct costs, such as engineering fees and wages to workers. See In re Northern Ind. Pub.
Serv. Co., No. 36689, slip op. at 15 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Aug. 11, 1982) (approved amortization of the cancelled nuclear plant including AFUDC). See also In re Northern States
Power Co., 46 P.U.R.4th 110, 111-12, 116-17 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n 1981) (reversed decision excluding AFUDC from the costs of the abandoned Tyrone Energy Park electric generating facility and found that costs could be included in the utility's rates); In re
Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., Nos. 4496/4504, slip op. at 14 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. Dec. 4, 1981)
(approved amortization of the cancelled facility including AFUDC). But see In re San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co., 31 P.U.R.4th 435, 446-47 (Cal. P.U.C. 1979) (adhered to its long-standing
policy on AFUDC by disallowing, as a recoverable expense, accumulated AFUDC in connection with an uncertificated and indefinitely deferred proposed project, noting that it was inappropriate and unreasonable for investors to realize a capitalized return on invested funds because the project did not come to fruition); In re Central Me. Power Co., Nos. 80-25, 80-66,
slip op. at 38-39 (Me. P.U.C. Oct. 31, 1980), affid, 433 A.2d 331 (Me. 1981) (excluded
AFUDC from the amortization amount to balance fairly the risk of noncompletion between
the ratepayers and the shareholders).
149. According to the EIA REPORT:
[T]he option most commonly chosen by regulators has been to amortize the plant's
abandonment loss over a fixed period (usually about 10 years) but not to allow the
utility to earn a return on the unamortized balance. This approach is usually justified on the grounds that it yields an equitable sharing of the costs between utility
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on all or a part of the unrecovered balance. 50
ratepayers and shareholders.
EIA REPORT. supra note 1, at 57. But see id. ("The only consistent exception to the generally
adopted practice has been that of the New York Public Service Commission, which has allowed a fully compensatory return to be earned, thereby virtually indemnifying the utility
investor against absorbing any of the cost.").
The following cases have allowed the write-off, but have denied a return on the unamortized balance: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, [19831985 Transfer Binder, State] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 24,610, 24,610.02, at 58,733 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 28, 1984) (10-year amortization); In re New England Power Co., [Current New Matters,
Federal] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) T 13,005, at 18,899, 18,901, 18,904 (Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n Apr. I1, 1985) (eight-year amortization); In re Northern States Power Co., 46
P.U.R.4th 110, 112 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n 1981) (10-year variable write-off); In
re New England Power Co., 18 F.P.C. S-84 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n 1979) (fiveyear write-off), a.f/'d sub nom. NEPCO Mun. Rate Comm. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 668 F.2d 1327, 1332-35 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Southern Cal. Edison Co., 50
P.U.R.4th 317, 341-42 (Cal. P.U.C. 1982) (four-year write-off); In re San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co., 31 P.U.R.4th 435, 449-500 (Cal. P.U.C. 1979) (five-year write-off); In re Connecticut
Light & Power Co., Nos. 810602, 810604 (Conn. Dep't Pub. Utils. Nov. 25, 1981) (three-year
write-off); In re Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., No. 36689, slip op. at 12-13, 16 (Ind. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n Aug. 1i, 1982) (15-year write-off); In re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46
P.U.R.4th 503, 557 (Me. P.U.C. 1982) (five-year write-off); In re Central Me. Power Co.,
Nos. 81-127, 81-206, slip op. at 31 (Me. P.U.C. Mar. 27, 1982) (five-year write-off); In re
Central Me. Power Co., Nos. 80-25, 80-66, slip op. at 35 (Me. P.U.C. Oct. 31, 1980) (fiveyear write-off), afid in relevant part, 433 A.2d 331, 344-45 (Me. 1981); In re Potomac Elec.
Power Co., No. 7597, slip op. at I I (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 28, 1982) (10-year writeoff); In re Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 52 P.U.R.4th 197, 221 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils.
1983) (two and three-year write-off periods); In re Commonwealth Elec. Co., 47 P.U.R.4th
229, 232-37 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982) (three-year write-off); In re Detroit Edison Co.,
No. U-5108, slip op. at 19, 49, 50 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n May 27, 1977) (10-year writeoff); In re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 P.U.R.4th 109, 115 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1983) (15-year
accelerated write-off); In re Hope Creek Investigation (Pub. Serv. Gas & Elec. Co.) No. 8012914, slip op. at 7-8 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Utils. Apr. 1, 1982) (15-year accelerated write-off); In re
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 44 P.U.R.4th 54, 57-58 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1981) (15-year
accelerated write-off); In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., No. 794-310, slip op. at 3-4 (N.J. Bd.
Pub, Utils. Apr. 11, 1980) (20-year write-off); In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., No. E-22,
sub. 273, slip op. at 23, 25 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n Dec. 5, 1983) (10-year write-off); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duquesne Light Co., 51 P.U.R.4th 198, 218, petitionfor reconsideration denied in relevant part, 52 P.U.R.4th 644, 649-51 (Pa. P.U.C. 1983) (10-year write-off);
In re Carolina Power & Light Co., No. 81-163-E, slip op. at 17, 18, 34 (S.C. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n June 1, 1982) (10-year write-off); In re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50
P.U.R.4th 157, 199-202 (Tex. P.U.C. 1982) (10-year write-off); In re Houston Lighting &
Power Co., No. 2001, slip op. at 548-49 (Tex. P.U.C. Dec. 5, 1978) (five-year write-off); In re
Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 49 P.U.R.4th 372, 392-93 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1982) (10-year
write-off); In re Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., Nos. 4496/4504, slip op. at 14 (Vt. Pub. Serv.
Bd. Dec. 4, 1981) (five-year write-off). One case approved a 10-year write-off but deferred a
decision on whether a return would be allowed. See In re Detroit Edison Co., 52 P.U.R.4th
318, 327-28 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983). In In re Long Island Lighting Co., No. 84-25,
slip op. at 52 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Sept. 19, 1984), the Commission denied a return on
unamortized balance not to deviate from its established policy but to effectuate a disallowance
of 30% of the costs incurred due to the utility's imprudence. Id.
150. In re Gulf Power Co., No. 800001-EU(CR), slip op. at 6-7, (Fla. Pub. Serv.
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Full recovery of cancellation costs through amortization into the

cost of service and by allowing a return on the unrecovered balance
is justified where the costs were prudently incurred. In fact, some
plant cancellation decisions have allowed full cost recovery based
solely on a finding of prudence with little or no additional discussion.' 5 ' This result is the proper one, as an analysis of the reasoning
behind, and impact of, amortizing cancelled plant costs over a period
of years demonstrates.

Expenses prudently incurred are generally included in the cost
of service. Large, extraordinary expenses, such as storm damage or
management studies, however, are often amortized over a number of
years to prevent variations in the revenue requirement as a result of
these extraordinary events. 152 Cancelled plant costs should be treated

like other extraordinary expenses. Although cancelled plant costs
153
could, theoretically, be recovered from ratepayers in a single year,

Comm'n Nov. 10, 1980) (five-year write-off); Ex parte Gulf States Util. Co., No. U-14495,
slip op. at 4 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov. 17, 1980) (10-year write-off); In re Boston Edison
Co., 46 P.U.R.4th 431, 471-73 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982) (13-year write-off) (leveraged
carrying charge allowed on non-AFUDC portion of the costs); In re Rochester Gas & Elec.
Corp., 45 P.U.R.4th 386, 410-11 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982) (three, five and 10-year
write-offs); In re Consolidated Edison Co., No. 28211, slip op. at 132 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Dec. 17, 1982) (eight-year write-off); In re Carolina Power & Light Co., 49
P.U.R.4th 188, 216-20 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1982) (return allowed only with respect to interest component) (10-year write-off); In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 48 P.U.R.4th 327, 34647 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1982) (company permitted to recover, through rate base, carrying
costs associated with senior capital related to unamortized cancellation costs, but no return
through rate base for common equity components supporting those unamortized costs) (10year write-off); In re Carolina Power & Light Co., No. E-2, sub. 366, slip op. at 29 (N.C.
Utils. Comm'n Apr. 22, 1980) (five-year write-off); In re Public Serv. Co., No. 27068, slip op.
at 59-60 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n Jan. 15, 1982) (return allowed only on debt and preferred
portion amortized loss, but not on equity portion) (10-year write-off); In re Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co., No. 05-CE-3, slip op. at 9-14 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 14, 1980) (three-year
write-off).
151. The Louisiana Public Service Commission made such a decision in Ex parte Gulf
States Util. Co., No. U-14495, slip op. at 4 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov. 17, 1980):
The Commission will accept the recommendation of Mr. Louiselle to allow a return
on the investment in the Blue Hills nuclear project, although this project has been
abandoned, because no evidence exists to show imprudence or negligence on the part
of the company in initiating the project. A ten-year amortization period for this loss
will be adopted.
Id. Similarly, the North Carolina Utilities Commission held that during the 10-year amortization period "the unrecovered balance should be included in rate base to avoid penalizing stockholders as a result of prudent management decisions." In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., No.
E-22, Sub. 257, slip op. at 7 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n Oct. 27, 1981).
152. See generally C.F. PHILLIPS, JR, supra note 4, at 248-49.
153. See In re Boston Edison Co., 46 P.U.R.4th 431, 472 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils.
1982).
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recovery will generally be spread over a period of years, because of
the large dollar amount normally associated with cancelled plants.,"
The trend towards amortization of large expenses was noted by the
Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission:
Simply because an expense is very large does not mean that by size
alone it is a rate base item. It is still an expense. However, size is a
factor in determining whether to amortize or to allow the expense
in a single year. To avoid rate shock, the prudent project expenses
...should be amortized. The trend across the nation seems to be
where amortization is allowed to amortize expenses of this sort over
ten years.155

Amortization alone, however, does not allow the utility to fully
recover its costs. Full recovery must also include a return on the un-

recovered balance 156 to cover the associated carrying costs.1 57 Otherwise, "[w]hile the dollar value of the prudent expense is recovered,

the time value of money indicates [that] the present value of that
expense is not recovered."' 58 For example, a $100 investment is not
recovered by payments of $5 per year over twenty years since the
present ,value of those payments will be significantly less than
$100.159
154. See EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 36 (table summarizing cancelled plant with
abandonment costs in excess of $50 million).
155. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 62
P.U.R.4th 557, 586 (Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n 1984).
156. Where no return is allowed, longer amortization periods increase the penalty borne
by the utility. Some commissions have recognized this in mandating short amortization periods
to offset the disallowance of a return. See, e.g., In re Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 52
P.U.R.4th 197, 221 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1983) (three-year amortization period); In re
Commonwealth Elec. Co., 47 P.U.R.4th 229, 233, 237 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982) (threeyear and two-year amortization periods); In re Central Mo. Power Co., Nos. 80-25 and 80-66,
slip op. at 39 (Mo. P.U.C. Oct. 31, 1980) (five-year amortization period).
157. The carrying costs associated with the abandoned plant should govern the rate of
return to be applied to the unamortized balance. The rate of return may be the utility's overall
rate of return or may be related to specific types of financial instruments. See, e.g., In re
Boston Edison Co., 46 P.U.R.4th 431, 472 n.149 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982) (return allowed at estimated cost of shorter term debt); In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 45
P.U.R.4th 386, 411 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982) (four utilities allowed to earn their overall.rates of return on unamortized cancellation costs); In re Consolidated Edison Co., 56
P.U.R.3d 337, 357 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1964) (utility allowed return at its capitalized
interest rate); In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 43 P.U.R.3d 210, 221-22, 234 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1962) (return at the interest rate on the mortgage debt permitted).
158. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 62
P.U.R.4th 557, 586 (Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n 1984).
159. Using a passbook rate of return (5.25%), the present value of annual $5 payments
over 20 years amounts to only $61. The present value is even lower if more realistic rates of
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The utility industry must construct a tremendous amount of
new capacity over the next decade in order to meet expected demands. A regulatory policy that penalizes utilities for the prudent
costs of cancelled plants will increase the risks and thereby the financing costs of new construction. Regulators can mitigate this result by allowing full recovery of prudent cancellation costs through
amortization of those costs and by permitting a return on the unrecovered balance to compensate investors for the time value of money.
C.

Misguided Rejection of Full Cost Recovery

Denial of full cost recovery for cancelled plants has been based
on a number of theories. Each theory fails to consider the effect such
a denial has on a utility's willingness to undertake such costly and
risky projects in the future.
1. The Cancelled Plant Is Not Used and Useful. - A maxim of
public utility regulation requires that property be used and useful in
providing service to the public before that property can be included
in rate base. This rule had its genesis in Smyth v. Ames,1 0° where
the Court held:
[T]he basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to
be charged by a corporation . . . must be the fair value of the
property being used by it for the convenience of the public ....
What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value
of that which it employs for the public convenience. 161
The used and useful test 6 2 has been applied to cancelled plants
in two ways. A few jurisdictions have applied the used and useful
test, rather than the prudent investment test, to bar utilities from
recovering any of their prudently incurred investments in cancelled
plants.' ' When applied to deny any recovery of prudent costs, the
return are used.
160. 169 U.S. 466 (1897).
161. Id. at 546-47.
162.

See supra note 14.

163. See cases cited supra note 15. See also ETA REPORT, supra note 1, at 40, which
states:
[C]ompletely disallow[ing project abandonment costs] for ratemaking purposes,
thereby forc[es] the utility investors and income taxpayers to bear the entire cost.
More specifically, the sharing of these costs between investors and taxpayers arises
because the utility writes off the cost as an extraordinary loss in the year of cancellation, thereby reducing its tax liability for that year. The actual cost to utility
investors is reduced by the amount of the tax saving - up to 50 percent of the project's abandonment cost - which depends on the utility's unused investment tax credits and tax losses carried forward from previous years. Because of the foregone tax
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used and useful test produces an unnecessarily harsh result for a
utility. For the most part, jurisdictions relying on the used and useful
test to deny any recovery have acted pursuant to that particular
state's ratemaking statute."" In Office of Consumers' Counsel v.
Public Utilities Commission, 6 5 the Ohio Supreme Court refused to
allow recovery of the costs of four cancelled nuclear plants because
Ohio's ratemaking statute did not allow recovery of costs that were
not service related.16 6 The Ohio Public Utilities Commission had allowed recovery of the investment in the plants because it found the
expenditures prudent under the prudent investment test.'6 7 In reversing the Commission, the court noted that although the overwhelming
majority of decisions from other jurisdictions supported the Commission's position, the prudent investment test was not the proper test
under the Ohio statute. 68 The court viewed the utility's petition for
recovery as a request to treat the costs of the cancelled plant as service-related even though those expenditures never produced any service for customers. 6 9
The Supreme Court of Wyoming also relied on a statutory used
and useful test'70 to affirm the decision of the Public Service Commission (PSC) denying recovery of the costs of the cancelled nuclear
plants in the Washington Public Power Supply System.' 7 The PSC
found that the projects could never become used and useful, and that
therefore the costs could not be considered in establishing a rate
72
base.'
revenues, a transfer occurs from utility investors to taxpayers.

Id.
164. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 14.
165.

67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981).

166. Id. at 163-64, 423 N.E.2d at 826-27. This denial was based upon a state statute,
which provided in relevant part: "The public utilities commission, when fixing and determining just and reasonable rates, fares, tolls, rentals and charges shall determine . . . [t]he cost
to the utility of rendering the public utility service for the test period.
... OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4909.15(A) (Page 1977).
167. 67 Ohio St. 2d at 163, 423 N.E.2d at 826.

168. Id. at 162-64, 423 N.E.2d at 826-27. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Public Util, Comm'n, 12 Ohio St. 3d 320, 327-28, 466 N.E.2d 917, 921, 924 (1984) (per curiam).
169. 67 Ohio St. 2d at 164, 423 N.E.2d at 827. Interestingly, in a later case, the Ohio

Commission allowed the utility an increased rate of return as a result of the losses associated
with the cancellation. Consumers' Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 111, 114,

447 N.E.2d 749, 753 (1983) (per curiam). Therefore, the costs were recovered indirectly instead of through direct amortization.
170. Wyo. STAT. § 37-2-119 (1977).
171.

Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 677 P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1984).

172. Id. at 804-05.
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The Indiana Court of Appeals reached a similar result when it
reversed the decision of the Indiana Public Service Commission and
denied any recovery of the costs of the cancelled Bailly N-1 nuclear
unit.173 Although Indiana has a statute requiring property to be used
and useful,1 7 4 the court did not find that it was compelled to deny
recovery on that basis.175 It merely adopted the used and useful test,
stating that the cancelled project was intended to be a capital expenditure and capital items could only be recovered by depreciation

once the facility went into service.176 Because the plant was cancelled before going into service, the utility could not recover its
1 77
investment.
Application of a used and useful statute to deny all recovery
appears to be the minority position.'7 8 Commissions in many jurisdictions with a ratemaking statute incorporating the used and useful
concept have refused to adopt the test.' 7 9 These commissions either

ignore the statute or construe it not to apply to cancelled plants.
PennsylvaniaPublic Utility Commission v. Duquesne Light C 1.80 is
illustrative of the latter approach. Pennsylvania has a statute provid-

ing that the cost of construction of new facilities shall not be made a
part of rate base nor otherwise included in the rates charged until
the facility is used and useful in service to the public. 81 When Duquesne Light requested recovery of the costs of cancelled generating

plants, the Office of Consumer Counsel argued that the statute pre173. Citizens Action Coalition v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 472 N.E.2d 938 (Ind.
App. 1984).

174.

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 8-1-2-6 (West 1982).

175. 472 N.E.2d at 947.
176. Id. at 946-47.
177. See supra note 146 (discussing the disincentive to cancel created by this rationale).
178. See, e.g., Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utils. Comm'n, discussed supra
notes 165-69 and accompanying text; In re Pacific Power & Light Co., 53 P.U.R.4th 24, 27
(Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983).
179. See, e.g., In re Carolina Power & Light Co., 55 P.U.R.4th 582, 600-01 (N.C.
Utils. Comm'n 1983). Cf. State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, [1983-1985
Transfer Binder, State] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 5 24,720 at 59,296 (Mo. Feb. 26, 1985). The
court found that a state statute prohibiting an electric utility from making any change based
upon the costs of construction in progress before the generating facility was fully operational
and used for service did not have the purpose, nor the effect, of divesting the Missouri Public
Service Commission of the authority to make an allowance for the abandoned construction of
the nuclear generating plant. Id. at 59,300. The Commission was entitled to consider the prudence of the expenditures and the abandonment, but the court expressed no opinion as to how
the Commission should exercise its authority. Id.
180. 52 P.U.R.4th 644 (Pa. P.U.C. 1983).
181. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1315 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
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vented recovery of those costs. 82 The Pennsylvania Cbmmission
found that the statute only precluded inclusion of construction work
in progress in rate base and did not apply to the cost of cancelled
plants. 183 The Commission noted that a literal interpretation of the
statute would exclude from the rate base any structure not utilized
in the generation, transmission and distribution of service, and that
such a result would be contrary to legislative intent. 8485Therefore, the
Commission did not apply the used and useful test.1
A second approach, used by most jurisdictions applying the used
and useful test, follows a two step analysis. First, the prudent costs
of the cancelled plant are established and amortized into a utility's
cost of service. Many of the commissions permit recovery of prudent
cancellation costs in this manner, then look to the used and useful
doctrine for the sole purpose of denying a return on the unrecovered
balance of cancellation costs. 186 This application of the used and useful test, however, should not foreclose the investors from recovering a
return on the unamortized balance during the amortization period.
First of all, a regulatory commission can allow a utility a return on
the unrecovered balance in order to assure that investors are compensated for the time value of money, without technically including
this balance in the rate base. 8 7 Second, application of the used and
useful doctrine to unrecovered cancellation costs expands the scope
of the doctrine beyond its original intent. Finally, the doctrine itself
may no longer apply to many current ratemaking issues, including
the treatment of cancelled plant costs.
Allowing a return on unrecovered cancellation costs is not necessarily equivalent to placing those unrecovered costs into rate base.
The New York Public Service Commission has long recognized this
182.
183.

52 P.U.R.4th at 649.
Id. at 650. See also State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, [1983-

1985 Transfer Binder, State] UTIL L. REP. (CCH)

24,720 at 59,296 (Mo. Feb. 26, 1985).

For a discussion of the case, see supra note 179.

184. Duquesne Light Co., 52 P.U.R.4th at 650 & n.2.
185. Id. at 651. Cf. State ex reL Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, [1983-1985
Transfer Binder, State] UTIL. L.

REP.

(CCH)

24,720.04 at 52,299 (Mo. Feb. 26, 1985)

(language of statute did not explicitly deal with abandoned projects, thus statute did not divest
state regulatory commission of authority to make an allowance for such costs in rate base).
186. See, e.g., In re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 50 P.U.R.4th 500, 532 (D.C. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1982); In re Detroit Edison Co., No. U-5108, slip op. at 19 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n May 27, 1977); In re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 P.U.R.4th 109, 115 (N.J. Bd. Pub.
Utils. 1983); In re Carolina Power & Light Co., No. 81-163-E, slip op. at 34 (S.C. Pub. Serv.

Comm'n June 1, 1982); In re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 P.U.R.4th 157, 202 (Tex.
P.U.C. 1982).

187. See infra text accompanying notes 188-94.
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distinction. 88 For example, in the early 1960's, changes in the gas
industry resulted in the retirement of a coke oven plant prior to the
end of its depreciable life. The New York Commission excluded the
unamortized balance of the cost of the coke oven plant from rate
base, while allowing a return on the unrecovered balance of the asset's cost at an interest rate equal to that on the company's mortgage
debt, which had been incurred at the time of the extraordinary
loss.' 89 The Commission noted that "[i]t would seem that all parties,
the customers and the stockholders, would be fairly treated if this
amount were excluded from the rate base but sufficient return allowed to meet the carrying charges thereon."190
Some commissions have found the distinction between allowing
a return on the unamortized balance and including the unamortized
balance in the rate base to be a matter of semantics.191 The distinction is important, however, because the rate of return necessary to
compensate investors for the time value of money is not necessarily
equal to the rate of return allowed on the utility's rate base. 192 The
standards applied in evaluating a rate of return on rate base have
been summarized as follows: "At a minimum, a public utility must
be afforded the opportunity not only of assuring its financial integrity so that it can maintain its credit standing and attract additional
capital as needed, but also of achieving earnings comparable to those
188. See infra text accompanying notes 189-90.
189. In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 43 P.U.R.3d 210, 222, 234 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1962).
190. Id. at 222. The New York Commission later reaffirmed the distinction:

In this proceeding, the evidence reviewed hereinbefore must lead to the conclusion that there be considered as a proper part of the cost of service both the amorti-

zation of the unrecovered property losses and also some recognition of the related
investment until the amortization is concluded. However, property retired and trans-

ferred to a suspense account such as "extraordinary property losses" cannot be
claimed as being "used and useful," nor is it necessary that such property be included in a rate base in order to allow reasonablerecognition of the fact that the
investment therein has not been recouped. A return on such unrecouped investment,
if warranted, can be provided by a carrying charge allowance similar to that made

for other items excluded, for special or unusual reasons, from the rate base.
In re Consolidated Edison Co., 56 P.U.R.3d 337, 376 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1964) (emphasis added).
191. See, e.g., In re Pacific Power & Light Co., 53 P.U.R.4th 24, 28 (Mont. Pub. Serv.

Comm'n 1983).
192.

For example, the 14% return allowed Boston Edison on the unamortized costs of

Pilgrim I1represented an estimate of the cost of shorter term debt. In re Boston Edison Co.,
46 P.U.R.4th 431, 472 n.149 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982). Boston Edison's overall rate of
return was 10.94%. Id. at 476-77.
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of other companies having corresponding risks." 193 Thus, including
the unrecovered portion of cancellation costs in the rate base, while
an appropriate method, is not the only method to compensate investors for the use of their money during the amortization period. 194
Such compensation should not be denied simply because a regulatory
authority believes that the used and useful principle forbids inclusion
of the unamortized costs in the rate base.
Utilizing the used and useful test to deny a rate of return on
unamortized cancellation costs is a misapplication of that doctrine.
The used and useful doctrine is not meant to exclude every non-operating asset from a rate base. 95 Rather than focusing on whether a
particular asset is operating, the "[m]uch more important [focus is]
whether the investment was made with a view toward providing utility service. Properly applied, the rule merely excludes from rate base
any investments that are unrelated to utility functions." 96 A utility's
prudent investment in a generating plant clearly meets this standard,
even if the plant is later cancelled.
Inclusion of non-operating prudent investments in a utility's rate
base is not new. After a thorough review of the used and useful doctrine, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker,19 7 permitted the District of Columbia
Public Utilities Commission to employ a prudent investment valuation of rate base.19 8 The court summarized the Commission's analysis as follows:
Here, the Commission adopted the prudent investment theory
of rate base valuation rather than the reproduction cost method.
Appraisal of the former theory reveals that the "used and useful"
standard is no necessary part of it. Primary emphasis is now being
placed not on "specific property, tangible and intangible" but on
capital prudently invested and embarked on an enterprise in the
193. C.F.
194.
195.

PHILLIPS, JR.,

supra note 4, at 331.

See supra text accompanying notes 188-93.
For example,

[a]ll utility plant, and particularly electric generation plant, is subject to outage,
both planned and unplanned. These outages can be over in minutes or they can
extend for months. It has never been a principle or practice that the rate base fluctuates as plant goes on or off the line.
Avery, The Costs of Nuclear Accidents and Abandonments in Rate Making, PUB. UrIL.
FORT., Nov. 8, 1979, at 17, 18.
196. Robinson, Utility Fiascoes- Who Should Pay?, PUB. UTIL FORT., Dec. 17, 1981,
at 17, 20.
197.

188 F.2d I1 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951).

198.

Id. at 17-20.
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public service .

. .

. If a unit of property resulting from prudent

investment becomes obsolete before it has been recovered in full by
the investor (either through annual depreciation charges or through
returns sufficient to compensate for such inadequacy), it is not necessarily erroneous as a matter of law for the Commission to include
it in the rate base until such recovery has occurred. Such a course
may be necessary in order to assure efficiency and progress in the
art and continued attraction of capital to the enterprise.19
Although Washington Gas Light Co. involved an abandonment
of property previously in service, its rationale is properly applicable
to the ratemaking treatment of unamortized cancellation costs. The
underlying issue in both situations is the same - whether a return
should be allowed on an investment made with a view toward providing utility service.200
Rigid application of the used and useful doctrine is no longer
practical and has been abandoned in several other significant areas
of ratemaking. 20 1 For example, a plant held for future use is not, by
definition, currently used and useful. But, as noted by Professor
Priest, prudent investments in a plant held for future use belong in
the rate base: "As a matter of sound business judgment, utilities
often must build beyond their immediate needs. If their investments
are provident and are made both in good faith and in the best interests of the area served, they plainly belong in rate base."2 02
An important trend allows some or all of construction work in
progress to be included in rate base. 203 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), in its order allowing up to fifty percent of
construction work in progress to be included in rate base, noted the
following need for flexibility in applying the used and useful doctrine: "[I]t must be reemphasized that the 'used and useful' concept,
if administered inflexibly and without regard to other equitable and
policy considerations, may fail the interests of both the electric util199.

Id. at 19 (footnotes omitted).

200. See In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 29 P.U.R.4th 65, 95-96 (Va. State Corp.

Comm'n 1979) (Shannon, Comm'r, dissenting in part). Commissioner Shannon reasoned that
investors in property devoted to public use are entitled to just compensation, i.e., to be compen-

sated for the use of their capital. Id. at 96. "The investor is constitutionally entitled to just
compensation for prudent expenditures. The rate-making mechanism must provide for a return

on the investment and the return of the investment. Because depreciation rates are not calculated to include the probabilities of extraordinary property losses, it is necessary to amortize
the loss of [cancelled plants]." Id. at 96 n.35.
201. See infra text accompanying notes 202-06.
202. 1 AJ.G. PRIEST, supra note 21, at 181.

203. Avery, supra note 195, at 18 (footnote omitted).
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ity industry and its ratepayers. ' ' 20 4 Because the ratemaking treat-

ment of cancelled plant costs involves substantially the same public
interest objectives considered by the FERC in adopting its construction work in progress policy, 205 the same flexible application of the
206
used and useful doctrine is proper.

2. Sharing of the Burden. - Another theory denying full cost
recovery for the costs of cancelled plants seeks to apportion the burden between investors and ratepayers. In a recent case, the Washing-

ton Utilities and Transportation Commission found a denial of a return during the amortization period to be a mechanism for dividing
the cancelled plant costs between investors and ratepayers, despite
the fact that all of the costs were found to have been prudently in-

curred.0 The Commission reasoned that "this [is] a proper mechanism to provide an incentive (or disincentive) to the company to be
sure that its initiation and management of large construction programs are in all respects prudent. ' 20 The logic of penalizing a utility when it has acted in a prudent manner so that a utility will act in
204. III FERC REP. (CCH) T 30,455, at 30,507 (May 16, 1983).
205. The FERC considered the following objectives:
(1) Mitigation of any bias against the construction of new generating facilities;
(2) Providing for electric rates to more accurately reflect the costs of providing
future service, allowing the need for new capacity to be tested, so far as possible, by the market place; and
(3) Furthering the goal of rate stability by providing for smoother increases in
electric rates to consumers.
Id., at 30,497.
206. At one time, the North Carolina Utilities Commission applied such a flexible
approach:
Therefore, the commission concludes that, just as working capital has been construed by the supreme court of this state to fall within the meaning of the term
"property used and useful. . . in providing service" as used in GS 62-133(b)(1), it
is also appropriate, both as a matter of law and as a matter of equity, to allow
CP&L to adjust and increase the working capital portion of its rate base to the
extent set forth hereinabove for the reason that the carrying charges in question
form a fair and reasonable part of CP&L's cost of service which must be paid upon
investor funds prudently advanced for plant costs and that such funds, even though
invested in a plant later abandoned, should technically, and as a matter of law, be
considered "property used and useful . . .in providing service" within the meaning
of GS 62-133(b)(1).
In re Carolina Power & Light Co., 49 P.U.R.4th 188, 219-20 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1982). In
that case, the North Carolina Commission only included in rate base the unamortized balance
supported by long-term debt. Id. at 216-20. The Commission recently changed its position and
denied a return on the unamortized balance. See In re Carolina Power & Light Co., No. E-2,
sub. 481, slip op. at 9, 16-17 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n, 1984).
207. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 62
P.U.R.4th 557, 586-87 (Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n 1984).
208. Id. at 587.
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a prudent manner in the future is elusive. The state of Washington,

however, is not alone in its desire to "share costs" or "balance the
risks" between utility investors and ratepayers as a justification for
2 09
denying a return on the unrecovered costs.
Another reason cited for sharing costs is that plant cancellation
costs are "extraordinary in nature. ' 210 This rationale, however, does
not support imposing costs on investors for prudent decisions of a
utility's management and fails to consider the capital intensive nature of the electric utility industry. Because the industry is so capital
intensive, each major capacity addition undertaken creates the risk
of cancellation and extraordinary loss. If these "extraordinary
losses" cannot be recovered, a utility and its investors will be unwilling to risk investment in new capacity.2
3. Management Control of Plant Construction. - Regulators
who have denied a return on some 212 or a11213 of the unamortized
balance of plant cancellation costs have done so because the investors control the company management and thus, the decision to build
as well as the subsequent decision to cancel the plant. Absent impru209. See, e.g., In re New England Power Co., [Current New Matters] UTIL L. REP.
(CCH) 113,005, at 18,899, 18,901, 18,904 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n Apr. II, 1985);
In re Central Ill. Light Co., 57 P.U.R.4th 351, 363-64 (Ill.
Commerce Comm'n 1983); In re
Central Me. Power Co., Nos. 80-25 & 80-66, slip op. at 37 (Me. P.U.C. 1980), affd in relevant part, 433 A.2d 331 (Me. 1981); In re Western Mass. Elec. Co., No. 84-25, slip op. at 3739 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. July 31, 1984). Cf. In re Washington Water Power Co., [19831985 Transfer Binder] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 24,656, 24,656.03 at 58,924 (Idaho P.U.C.
Jan. 30, 1985) (finding equal sharing between the utility's ratepayers and shareholders of pre1982 costs related to an abandoned nuclear plant to be reasonable method of allocating economic loss).
210. This approach was taken by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in In re
New England Power Co. [1979-1982 Transfer Binder] UTIL L. REP.(CCH) 1 12,210 (Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n July 19, 1979). For a thorough review of FERC decisions involving cancelled plants, see Wilson, Ratemaking Treatment of Abandoned Generating Plant
Losses, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 343, 345-52 (1982).
211. See generally supra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., In re Carolina Power & Light Co., 49 P.U.R.4th 188, 217-20 (N.C.
Utils. Comm'n 1982) (only the unamortized balance supported by long-term debt included in
rate base); In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 48 P.U.R.4th 327, 347 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n
1982) (return allowed only with respect to senior capital related to unamortized cancellation
costs); In re Public Serv. Co., No. 27068, slip op. at 60 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n Jan. 15, 1982)
(return allowed only on debt and preferred component because full recovery would unnecessarily reward equity owner).
213. See, e.g., In re Northern States Power Co., 42 P.U.R.4th 339, 362 (Minn. P.U.C.
1981). The Minnesota Commission, however, was reacting to a Wisconsin Public Service Commission denial of certification for the Tyrone plant. Id. at 35. This is evidenced by the Minnesota Commission's approval, in the same docket, of the amortization of the costs associated
with the prudently cancelled Sherco 4 Unit. Id. at 362-64.
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dence on the part of management, this rationale, like the sharing of
the burden rationale, makes little sense. In such a case, investors are
penalized for the prudent actions of management. The rational response by investors is to reward those managers who delay or forego
the decision to invest in new plant capacity.21"'
The management control rationale makes even less sense than
the sharing of the burden rationale, because prudent decisions to
build, to continue building and then either to complete or cancel a
plant are largely molded by forces outside of a utility's control. This
is especially true for nuclear plant cancellation decisions which have
2 15
resulted primarily from five factors:
(1) decreases in forecasted demand growth resulting from
the economic slowdown and a national conservation
trend following the Arab oil embargo;21 6
(2) regulatory change and uncertainty resulting in longer
lead times before commercial operation and costly redesign and backfitting to meet new or changed
2117
regulations;
(3) erosion of the economic advantages of nuclear generation because of escalating costs and lengthening lead
218
times;
(4) constraints on the ability of investor-owned utilities to
raise the capital necessary to finance lengthy construction programs because of high interest rates, escalating
costs, construction delays and regulatory change and
uncertainty; 219 and
(5) denial of the necessary state certifications for plants because of the aforementioned factors or because of polit20
ical opposition to nuclear power.
The burden of costs related to these factors, which are not within a
utility's control, should not fall on the utility's investors.
4. Traditional Business Would Not Earn a Return. - The Virginia State Corporation Commission analogized a nonregulated business to a regulated utility and concluded that because a nonregu214.

See supra notes 136, 141.

215. See EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-32.
216. Id. at 7-17.
217. Id. at 25-26.
218.

Id. at 26-30.

219. Id. at 17-25.
220.

Id. at 31-32.
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lated business would not earn a return on a cancelled investment, a
regulated utility should not earn a return on its unamortized cancellation costs.221 The analogy is inappropriate because the framework
of regulation changes the opportunities, options, burdens and risks
confronting a regulated utility. Unlike the nonregulated business, a
utility cannot choose its markets, products, and, most importantly,
its level of productive capacity. A utility's duty to serve the public
compels that a utility make investments in capacity in order to provide the cheapest power necessary to meet the demands of its
customers.

222

The FERC considered and rejected any analogy to nonregulated
business in establishing its construction work in progress policy:
In the Commission's opinion, there are significant differences between free market operations and the conditions under which regulated utilities operate. Accordingly, it may not be fruitful to attempt to defend either AFUDC or CWIP policies on the basis
of a
223
similarity to competitive markets, and we decline to do so.

In fact, the FERC noted that the inability of utilities to adjust prices
to reflect increasing demand, as a nonregulated firm would be able to
do, was partially responsible for the unrealized demand forecasts on
which the original decisions to build the later cancelled plant were
based: "Customers, on the other hand, attribute current difficulties
to reductions in demand forecasts. Yet, these overstated demand projections are, to some degree, a natural consequence of a regulatory
scheme which effectively conceals from consumers the high costs of
221. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 29 P.U.R.4th 65, 81 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n
1979). But see id. at 96 (Shannon, Comm'r, dissenting in part). Commissioner Shannon, in
dissent, argued that investors are compensated for the use of their capital in two ways: (1)
fixing depreciation rates or (2) by a regulator determining a rate of return. Id. If the risk of

abandonment is not so provided for, then rates must be approved that will enable investors to
receive just compensation for their original prudent investment until the investment is recovered through depreciation or amortization. Id. However, because of the need to maintain the
utility's financial viability, a hearing examiner, in subsequent proceedings considering the cancellation of a different generating unit, found that the "competitive model" could not be
strictly applied to the plant cancellation situation. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., No. PUC 830041, slip op. at 4 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n Feb. 1,
1984) (Hearing Examiner's Report). But see In re Western Mass. Elec. Co., No. 84-25, slip
op. at 39, 40, 41-42 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. July 31, 1984) ("[C]onsiderations of economic
efficiency and equity also require that the return that a utility receives on an investment should
be closely tied to the cost-effectiveness of the investment.").
222. See generally C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 4, at 106-07.
223. 1I FERC REP. (CCH) 1 30,455, at 30,509 (May 16, 1983).
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new service until after those costs have already been incurred. ' '224 It
is both inaccurate and inappropriate to utilize an analogy tb nonregulated business as the basis for denying a regulated utility full recovery of its prudently incurred costs. 225
CONCLUSION

Regulatory commissions should analyze utility plant cancellations in the same manner in which they analyze other utility managerial decisions, that is, on the basis of the facts and circumstances
existing at the time of the decision. If the decisions were the result of
prudent, reasonable analysis, then the utility should not be financially penalized for that decision.
Specifically, if the decisions to build the plant, to continue the
planning and construction of the plant and, finally, to cancel the
plant were all prudent, then the costs associated with the cancelled
construction project should be recoverable from the utility's customers over a reasonable period of time. During the period when these
costs are being recovered, investors should be allowed a return on
their unrecovered investment. Any ratemaking treatment short of
this full recovery by investors penalizes utility investors and, ultimately, discourages utilities from undertaking costly, risky projects
for new plant construction that are necessary to meet the nation's

energy requirements.

224. Id. at 30,493.
225. Professor Bonbright considered whether competition should serve as a guide for
regulation and concluded that the competitive model cannot and should not be adopted by the
regulator. J.C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 93-108 (1961).
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